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Abstract 
Considering features of the Japanese bicameral legislature and the electoral systems, 
this study argues that Japanese voters i;trategically place the four total votes to which they 
are entitled, two for the Lower House and two for the Upper House election. The view is 
that Japanese voters are ''balancing votes" by voting for different parties in various elec-
tions in an attempt to balance the power between the Lower House and Upper House or 
between ruling and opposition parties. That is, assume that a group of voters are split-
ticket voting within one election when voting for the Lower or Upper House, while other 
groups are split-ticket voting between elections. 
The analysis shows that the Japanese split-ticket voting is essentially "forced" onto the 
voters; however, the voting is also a result of the voters' decision to balance their votes, in 
that voters use their four votes according to circumstances. On the basis of this result, 
split-ticket voting in the bicameral system must take into account the split-ticket voting 
between elections as well as the split-ticket voting within one election. 
Key words: Split-Ticket Voting, Mixed Member Majoritarian system, Japanese electoion system 
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1. Introduction 
In 1994, the new electoral system was introduced to the Japanese House of Representatives 
(Lower House). Under the new system, 300 members are elected from the single-member districts 
(SMD) and 180 members are elected by the proportional representation (PR). Because these two 
operate independently in the selection of the members, this new system is called the Mixed Member 
Majoritarian (MMM) system. Under the Japanese MMM, the voter casts two vote: one for a candi-
date in SMD and the other for a party list in PR. Thus the new system allows split-ticket voting, 
which is able to support a different party in the two components of the contest, if they wish. 
Japan has also adopted the bicameral system. The Japanese House of Councillors (Upper House) 
is held significant political power in the policy making process, and all its members are elected by 
the MMM electoral system, in the same way the House of Representatives (Lower House) members 
are elected. Therefore, UH electoral system also gives Japanese voters the opportunity of the split 
ticket voting. They are well aware that the results of the Upper House election bring about a signifi-
cant change in Japanese politics, because the Uppser House is so powerful. In fact, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) could not secure a majority of seats for the elections held in 1977, 1989, 
and 2007, and subsequently Japanese politics faced major changes. Moreover, the elections for the 
Lower and Upper Houses are held frequently, and they only take a short period of time during 
which the poitical-economic factors such as the socio-economic environment, political party leaders, 
political party support rates do not change much (Table 1 ). 
Considering such features of the Japanese bicameral legislature and the electoral systems, this 
paper argues that Japanese voters strategically place the four votes they are entitled to in total, two 
for the Lower House election (LH election) and two for the Upper House (UH election). The view 
Table 1 Date of Japanese LH and UH election 
Election Date Span(Month) 
1996 LH 20-Oct-96 
1998 UH !2-Jul-98 21 
2000 LH 25-Jun-00 24 
2001 UH 29-Jul-0l 13 
2003 LH 9-Nov-03 28 
2004 UH l l-Jul-04 8 
2005 LH l l-Sep-05 14 
2007 UH 29-Jul-07 23 
2009 LH 30-Aug-09 25 
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is that Japanese voters are "balancing votes" (Fiorina 2002) by voting for different parties in various 
elections in an attempt to balance the power between LH and UH or ruling and opposite party. In 
other words, it is assumed that a group of voters are split-ticket voting within one election when 
voting for the Lower or Upper House, while another groups are split-ticket voting between the elec-
tions. 
In Japan, where the secondary House holds significant political power, some voters change the 
vote between the Lower House and the Upper House, regardless of the fact that there are no 
changes in party supports and policy preferences. Furthermore, such voters are deliberately balancing 
votes by accounting for how they affect the power balance. This paper argues these points through 
the analysis of the Japanese Election Study III (JESIII) panel survey data(!>. 
The analysis of this paper focuses on the voting behavior in the 2003 Lower House election (LH 
election) and the 2004 Upper House election (UH election). These two elections were held only 
eight months apart, and there were no significant differences in their electoral results. Therefore, 
they are appropriate for analyzing the points this paper focuses on. 
2. The "forced" split-ticket 
Both the 2003 Lower House (LH) election and the 2004 Upper House (UH) election resulted in 
wins for the Democratic Party Japan (DPJ), and defeat for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The 
DPJ gained more votes and seats especially in the proportional representation section, whereas the 
LDP lost seats in each of the two elections, and could not by itself maintain a majority of seats. 
However, the LDP managed to maintain a majority of seats by forming a coalition government with 
the Clean Government Party (CGP), and a regime change did not occur. In terms of the share of 
party specific or system specific votes, the DPJ outperformed the LDP in the Lower House Propor-
tional Representation (PR) and the 2004 Upper House electoral district and PR (Table 2). The 
striking feature of these results are that the CGP did not gain substantial votes in the Single Member 
District (SMD) nor the Mixed Member District (MMD), but succeeded in winnning a large share of 
votes in PR. This point explains most of the split-ticket voting in Japan. 
Hirano (2007) analyzed the 200 l UH election and the 2003 LH election, and argued that in most 
cases in Japan, the voters were forced to opt for the split-ticket voting. Supporters of the party that 
do not field a candidate in some constituencies, inevitably, have to vote for a different party in the 
(!) The Japanese Election Study III was conducted by Ken'ichi Ikeda, Yoshiaki Kobayashi, and Hiroshi Hirano. 
The project is supported by the Specially Promoted Research on Science (Ministry of Education). The sur-
vey was done before and after the House of Councilors election in July 2001 and 2004, and before and 
after the House of Representatives Election in June 2003 and 2005. 
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Table 2 Result of 2003LH and 2004 UH election 
2003 LH 2004 UH 
SMD PR MMD PR 
LDP 43.85 34.96 35.08 30.03 
DPJ 36.66 37.39 39.09 37.79 
CGP 1.49 14.78 3.85 15.41 
JCP 8.13 7.76 9.84 7.8 
SDP 2.87 5.12 1.75 5.35 
Others 7.0 0.0 10.15 3.62 
Single Member Distsrict (SMD) and Proportional Representation (PR). In fact, it is shown that the 
straight ticket voting option is chosen in many cases for the LDP, the DPJ and the Japan Communist 
Party (JCP) which field candicates in many electoral districts and the split ticket voting is chosen in 
many cases for other parties. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the parties which voters sup-
port do not field any candidate in most electoral districts, and therefore the Japanese voters are 
"forced" to choose the split ticket voting. 
When examining the Proportional Representation (PR) voting patterns in the 2003 LH election 
and the 2004 UH election, it is clear that this tendency of a "forced" split ticket is also observed in 
the 2004 UH election. {Table 3, Table 4) The columns are the votes for the Proportional Representa-
tion (PR), and the rows are the votes for the Single Member District (SMD). Within each box, the 
upper row (numbers in larger fonts) are the ratio within the total votes, and the lower row (numbers 
in smaller fonts) are the ratio within the Proportional Representation (PR) votes. For example, Table 
3 shows that the LDP's straight voters were 36.5% within the total voters. The table also shows that 
82.6% of those who voted for the LDP in the Proportional Representation (PR) voted for the LDP in 
the Single Member District (SMD). 
When observing the split ticket voting pattern in the 2003 LH election, voting for the CGP in 
PR and the LDP in SMD was the most popular pattern, comprising 7.01 % of the total, and voting 
for the DPJ in PR and voting for the LDP in SMD was the second most popular pattern, comprising 
5.89% of total. Also, it is possible to see that 76.69% of those who voted for for the CGP in PR 
voted for the LDP in SMD, and 37.31% of those who voted for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
in PR voted for the DPJ in SMD. Moreover, those who voted for the DPJ in PR and the LDP in 
SMD were 15.51%, while voters who voted for the LDP in PR and the DPJ in SMD were 6.09%. 
In the 2004 UH election, the most popular pattern, comprising 5.8%, was to vote for the CGP in 
PR and the LDP in SMD, and the next most popular pattern, comprising 3.54%, was to vote for the 
DPJ in PR and the LDP in SMD. 50.28% of voters who voted for the CGP in PR voted for the 
LDP in SMD, and 50.28% of voters who voted for the SDP in PR voted for the DPJ in SMD, 
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Table 3 Split-Ticket Voting in 2003 LH Election 
PR 
SMD LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP N 
36.51% 5.89% 7.01% 0.62% 0.39% LDP 899 
82.61% 15.51% 76.69% 16.42% 7.95% 
2.69% 27.59% 0.90% 1.40% 0.95% DPJ 598 
6.09% 72.67% 9.82% 37.31% 19.32% 
CGP 1.23% 0.28% 
0.84% 0.00% 0.00% 
42 
2.79% 0.74% 9.20% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.28% 1.35% 0.00% 1.35% 0.17% SDP 56 
0.63% 3.55% 0.00% 35.82% 3.41% 
0.28% 0.90% 0.06% 0.28% 3.37% JCP 87 
0.63% 2.36% 0.61% 7.46% 68.18% 
0.90% 0.28% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% NCP 22 
2.03% 0.74% 0.61% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.22% 0.45% 0.06% 0.11% 0.00% 
Others 15 
0.51% 1.18% 0.61% 2.99% 0.00% 
2.08% 1.23% 0.22% 0.00% 0.06% 
Independent 64 
4.70% 3.25% 2.45% 0.00% 1.14% 
N 788 677 163 67 88 1783 
Table 4 Split-Ticket Voting in 2004 UH Election 
PR 
SMD LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP Others N 
29.92% 3.54% 5.84% 0.26% 0.20% 0.26% LDP 610 
82.46% 8.61% 50.28% 6.78% 3.66% 15.38% 
3.02% 31.96% 1.51% 1.51% 0.66% 0.26% 
DPJ 593 
8.32% 77.67% 12.99% 38.98% 12.20% 15.38% 
0.33% 0.07% 2.69% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% CGP 48 
0.90% 0.16% 23.16% 0.00% 1.22% 0.00% 
0.13% 0.66% 0.07% 0.79% 0.00% 0.00% 
SDP 25 
0.36% 1.59% 0.56% 20.34% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.33% 0.66% 0.39% 0.72% 4.00% 0.46% JCP 100 
0.90% 1.59% 3.39% 18.64% 74.39% 26.92% 
0.00% 
Others 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.85% 
2.56% 4.27% 1.12% 0.59% 0.46% 0.66% 
Independent 147 
7.05% 10.37% 9.60% 15.25% 8.54% 38.46% 
N 553 627 177 59 82 26 1524 
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showing the same tendency as the 2003 LH election result. However, the ratio of those who voted 
for the DPJ in PR and the LDP in SMD has slightly decresed from the 2003 LH election period, 
and in contrast the ratio of those who voted for the LDP in PR and the DPJ in SMD has increased 
to 8.32%. 
Table 5 compiled a restricted data of reasons why the voters who opted for the split-ticket voting 
chose such options. For the 2003 and 2004 elections, the most popular reason for choosing the split 
ticket voting was that "There is no candidate from the party I support in my constituency". The sec-
ond most popular reason was that "I chose for whom to vote regardless of candidate's affiliate 
party", and the third was that "In the proportional-representation district, there is a candidate I sup-
port". The ratio of so-called "strategic voters" who vote for the candidate who have a reasonable 
chance of winning was the least popular in both elections. 
Table 6 and Table 7 compiled the reasons for why voters decided to vote for particular candidate 
in both SMD and PR. Data for the straight ticket voters were separated from the data for the split 
ticket voters. 
In the 2003 SMD, the reasons for why the straight ticket voters decided on a particular candi-
date, in the following order, were: "support for the party", "the candidate's personality", and "each 
party's policy". The reasons for the split ticket voters, in the following order, were "the candidate's 
personality", "support for the party", and "benefit for the local area". In the 2003 PR, the reasons 
for why the straight ticket voters decided on a particular candidate, in the following order, were: 
"support for the party", "party policy", and the "support for the party". The reason for the split 
ticket voters, in the following order, were "party policy", "support for the party", and "balance for 
the seats in the house". In the 2004 UH election SMD, the straight ticket voter's reason for deciding 
on a particular candidate were, in the following order: "support for the party", "the candidate's per-
Table 5 The reason to split ticket 
There is no candidate from the party I support in my constituency 
In my constituency, the candidate from the party I support probably win 
In my constituency, the candidate from the party I support probably Lose 
In the proportional-representation district, there is a candidate I support 
I_ chose for whom to vote regardless of candidate's affiliate party 
I considered the balance of the seats 
Others 
DK 
NA 
N 
2003 
41.4 
7.2 
2.9 
13.6 
18.0 
5.5 
7.0 
2.6 
1.7 
345 
2004 
35.6 
4.3 
2.6 
12.0 
17.2 
10.3 
13.3 
2.1 
2.6 
233.0 
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Table 6 Reason for vote in 2003 (N=l750) 
SMD PR 
Straight Split Straight Split 
Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet 6.8% 6.1% 9.4% 7.5% 
Support for the party 41.2% 16.1% 47.4% 31.1% 
Each party's policy 9.5% 6.8% 16.2% 21.1% 
Personality of the candidate 17.9% 29.2% 6.0% 3.6% 
Candidate's policy 4.5% 5.7% 2.3% 4.4% 
Benefit for the workplace 0.8% 1.9% 0.9% 0.4% 
Benefit for the local area 8.3% 13.4% 5.6% 3.6% 
Balance of the seats in the House 5.2% 7.6% 7.9% 12.7% 
Request (s) to vote for the candidate 2.3% 8.1% 2.3% 11.5% 
Other 3.5% 5.1% 1.8% 4.0% 
Table 7 Reason for vote in 2004 (N=l469) 
MMD PR 
Straight Split Straight Split 
Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet 5.7% 3.9% 7.1% 7.6% 
Support for the party 53.8% 26.7% 54.8% 32.8% 
Each party's policy 7.9% 5.3% 12.6% 12.6% 
Personality of the candidate 11.9% 23.0% 4.6% 9.4% 
Candidate's policy 4.3% 10.1% 3.2% 3.1% 
Benefit for the workplace 0.7% 1.8% 1.5% 1.8% 
Benefit for the local area 2.9% 6.4% 2.2% 3.4% 
Balance of the seats in the House 6.3% 6.4% 6.8% 8.3% 
Request(s) to vote for the candidate 4.2% 10.8% 4.8% 17.1% 
Other 2.4% 5.5% 2.3% 3.8% 
sonality", and "each party's policy", whereas the reasons for the split ticket voters were, in the 
following order, "support for the party", "the candidate's personality", and "request(s) to vote for the 
candidate". In the 2004 PR, the straight ticket voter listed the reasons, in the following order: "sup-
port for the party", "each party's policy" and "support for the party leader", whereas the split ticket 
voter listed the reasons, in the following order: "support for the party", "request(s) to vote for the 
candidate", and "each party's policy". 
As these data indicate, the split-ticket voting in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election 
were "forced" onto the voters. With regards to the determining reasons for votes, many split ticket 
voters responded that they were "requested to vote for a particular candidate", in addition to 
responding that support for a particular candidate or the evaluation of the candidates became the 
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determining factors. From this, it is possible to conclude that a large proportion of the voters whose 
supporting party do not field any candidate in their SMD were requested by the supporters of a par-
ticular party to vote for that party, and as a result opted for the split ticket voting. 
When overviewing the total picture in this way, it appears that the balancing of votes, the major 
argument of this paper, has not taken place. However, there is another possibility when focusing the 
analysis on the voters who were not "forced" to opt for the split ticket voting. Therefore, the analy-
sis of next section limits the samples who voted for the LDP and the DPJ, which fielded candidates 
in most SMDs, and examines the reasons why such voters opted for either straight tickt voting or 
the split ticket voting. 
3. Balance voting 
Why did voters who were not forced to take the split ticket voting option decided to choose the 
split ticket voting? Also, how did voters manage to use the two votes for the LH election and the 
two votes for the UH election according to the circumstances? This section limits the samples who 
voted for the LDP or the DPJ in both SMDs and PR in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH 
election<2> • 
Initially, a cross tally was conducted for the options of the straight ticket voting and the split ticket 
voting in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election (Table 8). 
Those who opted for the straight ticket voting for both elections were 84.2%, and those who 
opted for the split ticket voting in one of the elections or both were 15.8%. It should be noted that 
the samples include those who opted for straight voting for the LDP in the 2003 LH election, and 
for the DPJ in the 2004 UH election (or the reverse pattem).Such samples were 49, and their ratio 
was 8.1 %. Following this, those who voted in the same party for all of the four votes comprised 
76.1 %, and those who voted for a different party for one of the four votes comprised 23.9%. 
Table 8 Straight-Split in 2003 and 2004 
2004 
2003 Straight Split N 
Straight 84.2% 5.0% 537 
Split 9.3% 1.5% 65 
N 563 39 602 
(2) The sample is 602. In later analysis, the sample size will be smaller because there are many samples that do 
not respond to the specific questions used for the analysis. 
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Next, Table 9 illustrates the patterns of how the voters allo-
cated the four votes (3)_ 
With regards to the allocation pattern, there are 16 patterns 
altogether, because there are two options (the LDP or the DPJ) 
and four opportunities for voting. The patterns are calculated 
using the following formula: 24=16. The compositions of these 
are the following. Those who voted for the LDP for all of the 
four votes (the LDP straight) comprise 43.7%, and those who 
voted for the DPJ for all of the four votes comprise 32.4%. 
Those who voted for a different party for one or two votes (split 
ticket voter) comprise 23.9%. Also, because the LDLD pattern 
and the DLDL pattern are identical voting patterns in the two 
elections, the voters who changed the voting pattern (called the 
"voters with change of pattern") comprise 22.8%. 
Therefore, the reasons for deciding the party to vote for, 
was compiled for each of the 3 (4) voting patterns (Table 10). 
The DPJ straight voters consider the party support, the party 
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Table 9 Pattern of voting 
LLLL 43.7 
LLLD 2.3 
LLDL 1.7 
LDLL 1.2 
DLLL 2.3 
LLDD 6.1 
LDLD 1.0 
LDDL .3 
DOLL 2.0 
DLLD .0 
DLDL .2 
DDDL .7 
DDLD .3 
DLDD 1.5 
LDDD 4.3 
DDDD 32.4 
N 602 
policy and the balance of seats as important factors, whereas the LDP straight voters consider the 
party support, evaluation of the party leader and the candidate important. The proportion of the party 
support emphasis by the split ticket voters is relatively low, and they tend to consider the candidate 
important in SMDs, and the party's policy and the balance of seats important in PR. 
Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13 illustrates the perceptions of the "voters with change of pattern" 
regarding the election results or the regime patterns. Table 11 shows the degree of satisfaction with 
the 2003 LH election results. It is presumed that the voting patterns changed due to dissatisfactions 
with the 2003 LH election results, but such a tendency is not found. Instead, the voters who were 
dissatisifed were the DPJ straight voters. 
Table 12 illustrates voters' ideas about the most desirable regime patterns. In contrast to the the 
LDP's straight voters or the DPJ's straight voters wishing for the the LDP centered regime or the 
DPJ centered regime respectively, it is clear that the "voters with change of pattern" did not refuse 
neither the LDP nor the DPJ. 
Table 13 illustrates voters' ideas about the balance of the seats between the Lower House and 
the Upper House. Half or more than half of the the LDP straight voters responded that it is desir-
(3) From left, the votes for SMDs in the 2003 LH, PR in 2003 LH, MMD in the 2004 UH, PR in the 2004 UH 
are shown. 
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Table 10 Reason for vote (3 categories) 
2003 SMD 2003 PR 2004 MMD 2004 PR 
LDP straight Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet 13.3 16.0 9.5 10.6 
Support for the party 46.0 52.5 64.3 65.8 
Each party's policy 1.9 7,2 1.9 4.9 
Personality of the candidate 18.6 6,8 10.3 3.0 
Candidate's policy 2.3 I.I I.I 1.5 
Benefit for the workplace .8 .4 .8 I.I 
Benefit for the local area 11.8 9.5 4.2 3.8 
Balance of the seats in the House .4 1.9 I.I .4 
Request(s) to vote for the candidate 1.9 3.0 4.2 6.1 
Other 2.3 .8 .4 
DK 1.5 1.5 2.3 
NA .8 .4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2003 SMD 2003 PR 2004 MMD 2004 PR 
DPJ straight Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet 3.6 5.1 1.0 2.6 
Support for the party 43.6 42.6 54.9 56.9 
Each party's policy 14.4 24.1 11.3 11.3 
Personality of the candidate 13.3 5.6 11.3 4.1 
Candidate's policy 6.7 2.6 3.1 3.6 
Benefit for the workplace .5 1.5 
Benefit for the local area 1.5 1.0 1.0 
Balance of the seats in the House 11.8 14.9 12.3 13.8 
Request(s) to vote for the candidate .5 1.5 1.5 
Other 4.1 3.6 2.1 3.1 
DK .5 .5 1.0 1.0 
NA .5 
Total 100.0 100.0 !00.0 100.0 
2003 SMD 2003 PR 2004 MMD 2004 PR 
split Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet 5,6 9.7 5.6 8.3 
Support for the party 24.3 38.2 38.9 44.4 
Each party's policy 6,9 17.4 5,6 12.5 
Personality of the candidate 32.6 2.8 16.7 4,2 
Candidate's policy 1.4 3.5 5.6 4,2 
Benefit for the workplace 3.5 2.8 1.4 2.1 
Benefit for the local area 15.3 5.6 5.6 .7 
Balance of the seats in the House 2.1 II.I 12.5 10.4 
Request(s) to vote for the candidate 2,1 2.8 2.8 4.9 
Other 3.5 3.5 2.1 2.1 
DK .7 1.4 2.8 4.2 
NA 2.1 1.4 ,7 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 11 Satisfaction with the result of House of Representatives Election (N=580) 
Very satisfied Somewhat Can't say Somewhat Very 
satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied 
LOP 7.5% 42.9% 33.1% 14.6% 2.0% 
OPJ 3.1% 34.2% 23.8% 31.6% 7.3% 
change 3.8% 37.6% 36.1% 18.8% 3.8% 
Table 12 Opinion on the form of coalition (N=498) 
Coalition Coalition Coalition Single LOP government government government other government with LOP including LOP 
excluding LOP 
excluding OPJ and OPJ 
LOP 38.8% 37.5% 20.1% 2.7% 0.9% 
OPJ 2.4% 4.2% 43.0% 39.4% 10.9% 
change 18.3% 16.5% 52.3% 10.1% 2.8% 
Table 13 Do you think the balance of seats between the parties should 
be relatively the same between the House of Councilors and 
the House of Representatives? (N=553) 
They should be the They should be Can't say either way 
same different 
LOP 53.3% 29.3% 17.4% 
OPJ 42.1% 36.1% 21.9% 
change 35.9% 39.8% 24.2% 
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able to have the same balance. On the other hand, almost 40% of the "voters with change of 
patterns" resonded that it is more desirable if the balance were different. A relatively high proportion 
of the DPJ straight voters also responded that it is more preferable if the balances were different. 
Based on these basic compilations of data as the precondition, a multinominal logistic analysis 
was conducted. The analyses are twofold. In Analysis 1, the dependent variables are "the LDP 
straight voter", "the DPJ straight voter" and "split ticket voter" respectively. In Analysis 2, the 
dependent variables are "the LDP straight voter", "the DPJ straight voter", and "voters with change 
of pattern" respectively. The basic category in both analyses is the "the LDP straight voter". An 
identical independent variable is used for both analyses. Firstly, with regard to the party support, it 
is suggested that the independent voters opt for the split ticket voting. The attitudes towards the 
seats gained by the LDP and the DPJ in the 2003 LH election are also likely be influential. In any 
case, any voter who thinks that "the party gained too many (or too few) seats" is likely to change 
their voting pattern. The most important factor for this paper is the reason for deciding which party 
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to vote for. The more the voter emphasizes the "balance of seats in the House", the more likely that 
such a voter opts for the split ticket vote or changes the voting pattern <4>_ 
The change of voting pattern depends on the voters' shift in attitudes between elections. It is 
presumed that the changes in party support and changes in individual policy preference bring about 
the split ticket or the change of pattern. In addition, a change in the voter's individual living stan-
dards also influences the changes in voting patterns. Gender and age are used as the control 
variables. 
The result of Analysis I is shown in Table 14, and the result of Analysis 2 is shown in Table 15. 
Table 14 illustrates that the split ticket voting is chosen by the OPJ supporters or voters who 
emphasize the importance of candidates or the balance of seats, or those who consider that the seats 
gained by the DPJ in the 2003 LH election were too few or appropriate. The table also illustrates 
that the split ticket voting is chosen by voters who changed the party to support. Table 15 illustrates 
that the "voters with the change of pattern" are the OPJ supporters, or voters who emphasize the 
importance of balancing seats, or those who consider that the seats gained by the OPJ in the 2003 
LH election were too few or appropriate. The table also illustrates that the "voters with the change 
of pattern" are the voters who changed the party to support. The changes in individual policy prefer-
ence or the perceptions on the seats gained by the LOP had no impact.Furthermore, the voter being 
an independent voter did connect with the split ticket voting. 
In addition, it is clear from Table 14 that in comparison with with the LOP straight voters, the 
OPJ straight voters are the OPJ supporters and voters who decides on the voting candidate by con-
sidering the balance of seats, who considers that the LOP gained too much seats and the OPJ gained 
too few seats in the 2003 LH election, and who also changed the policy preference regarding the 
constitutional amendment. Table 15 illustrates that it is also possible for indpenednet voters to 
become straight voters. 
The balancing votes, mainly by relying on the balancing of seats as the reason for determining 
votes, significantly influenced both the split ticket voting and the change of voting patterns. Thus 
considering the balance of political power between the Lower House and Upper House by voters is 
one of the major explanatory factors for split ticket voting in Japan. 
(4) With regard to the "party" which became the reason for determing the vote, if the voter selected "support for 
the party leader", "support for the party", or "each party's policy" once or more, the dummy variable is "l", 
and in all other cases the dummy variable is "O". With regard to the "candidate" which became the reason 
for determiing the vote, if the voter selected "personality of the candidate "or" candidate's policy once or 
more, the dummy variable is "l" and in all other cases the dummy variable is "O". 
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Table 14 multinomial logistic Regression analysis -1 
B Sig S.E. 
Spiit gender male -.787 .095 .471 
age 
party support 
Reason of vote 
LDP seat share 2003 
DP J seat share 2003 
packet book 
changed policy prefarence 
DPJ gender 
age 
party support 
Reason of vote 
LDP seat share 2003 
DPJ seat share 2003 
packet book 
changed policy prefarence 
Nagelkerke-Rsq: .749 
20-29 
30-39 
independent 
party 
more 
just enough 
worsen 
keep intact 
economic 
welfare 
constitution 
self-defence 
constant 
male 
20-29 
30-39 
independent 
1.079 
1.073 
.520 
.073 
-.301 
-.017 
-.203 
-.279 
.511 
.499 
.703 
-.384 
-4.752 
-.734 
.567 
1.029 
2.149 
.290 
.100 
.499 
.908 
.718 
.982 
.662 
.734 
.249 
.260 
.104 
.378 
.000 
.201 
.668 
.215 
.009 
1w.1a1111~iiiJ;ii!1!1Hllii!~!fl~:i\il/1lil~'.11!iifl1!!!1iii 
1! ' ' ,lliiii M ' ;;:;:):~~/!!'lii.:;;:;.1o~· A~,;:::1,1H1,,hiliffoi!ll!ll1~1i.,~!lt1l(h'h: 
change .587 .414 
party .095 .900 
candidate .852 .123 
enough -1.231 .116 
1.019 
.653 
.824 
.608 
.770 
1.147 
.661 
.638 
.439 
.745 
.834 
.760 
.919 
.753 
.466 
.822 
.443 
.443 
.432 
.435 
1.349 
.574 
1.319 
.831 
.941 
.719 
.824 
1.192 
.718 
.757 
.552 
.834 
1.062 
.782 
1.126 
enough 1.509 .130 .998 
worsen -.006 
keep intact -.746 
economic .652 
welfare -. 134 
i~HIH'-Tf]Jf~if 
self-defence -.202 
constant -4.745 
N=308 
.991 .568 
.472 1.036 
.224 
.801 
":!li:Z 
-·,:·::,., ...•. , ... : 
.705 
.003 
.537 
.530 
.529 
.533 
1.620 
69 
70 
Table 15 multinomial logistic Regression analysis -2 
8 Sig. S.E. 
Split gender male -.882 .064 .477 
age 20-29 1.090 .287 1.024 
30-39 1.006 .131 .667 
· ;032 .822 
... ··1026. .622 
party support independent .591 .444 .772 
1.158 
.671 
Reason of vote party -.036 .955 .637 
candidate .790 .075 .443 
.742 
LOP seat share 2003 more -.298 .724 .843 
-.066 .932 .771 
0 P J seat share 2003 4,339· ,00.Q: .912 
·2;n4 ,003 .749 
packet book worsen -.176 .708 .469 
keep intact -.317 .710 .852 
changed policy prefarence economic .480 .281 .446 
welfare .415 .352 .446 
constitution .813 .065 .441 
self-defence -.462 .296 .442 
constant -4.453 .001 1.356 
OPJ gender male -.793 .173 .582 
age 20-29 .507 .704 1.337 
30-39 .918 .279 .848 
.2,435 ,Oip .944 
IA24 ,051 . .731 
party support . s '2145 · •·• .'.9o·v. .831 
<;~;62:/· ,,... 
···•,ooo:r;• 1.208 :,1;.,·· .. , 
change .484 .507 .730 
Reason of vote party .100 .896 .764 
candidate .932 .098 .563 
.834 
LOP seat share 2003 1.061 
enough -1.315 .096 .791 
OPJ seat share 2003 '·~~;~1~·· 4,5(i'7 .• ooo., 1.130 
enough 1.528 .129 1.005 
packet book worsen .119 .835 .573 
keep intact -.828 .438 1.067 
changed policy prefarence economic .535 .323 .542 
welfare -.158 .768 .535 
.539 
self-defence -.305 .573 .541 
constant -4.628 .005 1.638 
Nagelkerke-Rsq: .751 N=304 
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4. Conclusion 
In Japan, where the secondary House is powerful, voters demand a balance of power and choose 
their voting behavior according to such a perception. Because of this, the voting behavior in the LH 
election is inevitably affected to a certain degree by the UH elections, and the voting behavior in the 
UH election is inevitably affected by the LH elections respectively. Moreover, Japan adopted the 
Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) electoral system for both the Lower House and the Upper 
House. Due to the adoption of MMM, the split ticket voting in Japanese elections offer the option 
of how to use the four votes, not the option of how to use only two votes. 
The analysis of this paper clarified that the Japanese split ticket voting are basically "forced" 
onto the voters, but on the other hand the split ticket voting is also a result of the voters' balancing 
of votes, from the perspective that voters use four votes according to circumstances. According to 
this result, the split ticket voting in the bicameral system must take into account the split ticket vot-
ing between elections, not only the split ticket voting within one election. 
References 
Cox, Gary W .. Frances Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, (2000) "Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions, 
and Party Structure: Conservative Factions in Japan's Upper and Lower Houses." American 
Journal of Political Science 44:115-122. 
Fiorina, Morris. P. (2002) Divided Government (Longman Classics 2nd Edition). Longman. 
Hirano, Hiroshi. (2007) Changes in the Voting Behavior of Japanese Society, Bokutakusha, Japan. 
Johnston, R. J. and C. J. Pattie, (2002), 'Campaigning and Split-Ticket Voting in New Electoral Sys-
tems: The First MMP Election in New. Zealand. Scotland, and Wales', Electoral Studies, 
21:583-600. 
Acknowledgement 
This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B, No. 21330031 ), from Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science (JSPS). 
